

the power of knowledge, for power through knowledge, for the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence, by each of the agents or groups of agents involved in it, whether they be ordinary individuals, exposed to the vicissitudes of everyday symbolic struggle, or authorized (and full-time) professionals, which includes all those who speak or write about social classes, and who can be distinguished by the extent to which their classifications involve the authority of the state, as holder of the monopoly of *official naming*, of the right classification, of the right order.

While the structure of the social field is defined at each moment by the structure of the distribution of capital and the profits characteristic of the different particular fields, the fact remains that in each of these arenas, the very definition of the stakes and the trump cards can be called into question. Every field is the site of a more or less openly declared struggle for the definition of the legitimate principles of division of the field. The question of legitimacy arises from the very possibility of this questioning, from this break with the *doxa* which takes the ordinary order for granted. That being said, the symbolic force of the parties involved in this struggle is never completely independent of their positions in the game, even if the specifically symbolic power of naming constitutes a force which is relatively independent of the other forms of social power. The constraints of the necessity inscribed in the very structure of the different fields still weigh on the symbolic struggles which aim to preserve or transform that structure. The social world is, to a great extent, something which agents make at every moment; but they have no chance of unmaking and remaking it except on the basis of a realistic knowledge of what it is and of what they can do to it by virtue of the position they occupy in it.

In short, scientific work aims to establish an adequate knowledge both of the space of objective relations between the different positions which constitute the field and of the necessary relations that are set up, through the mediation of the *habitus* of those who occupy them, between these positions and the corresponding stances, i.e. between the points occupied in that space and the points of view on that very space, which play a part in the reality and development of that space. In other words, the objective delimitation of constructed classes, of *regions* of the constructed space of positions, enables one to understand the source and effectiveness of the classificatory strategies by means of which agents seek to preserve or modify this space, in the forefront of which we must place the constitution of groups organized with a view to defending the interests of their members.

Analysis of the struggle over classifications brings to light the political ambition which haunts the nosological ambition to produce the correct classification: an ambition which properly defines the *rex*, the one who has the task, according to Benveniste, of *regere fines* and *regere sacra*, of tracing in speech the frontiers between groups, and also between the sacred and the profane, good and evil, the vulgar and the distinguished. If social science is not to be merely a way of pursuing politics by other means, social scientists must take as their object the intention of assigning others to classes and of thereby telling them what they are and what they have to be (herein lies all the ambiguity of forecasting); they must analyse, in order to repudiate it, the ambition of the creative world vision, that sort of *intuitus originarius* which would make things exist in conformity with its vision (herein lies all the ambiguity of the Marxist conception of class, which is inseparably both a being and an ought-to-be). They must objectify the ambition of objectifying, of classifying from outside, objectively, agents who are struggling to classify others and themselves. If they do happen to classify – by carving up, for the purposes of statistical analysis, the continuous space of social positions – it is precisely so as to be able to objectify *all* forms of objectification, from the individual insult to the official naming, without forgetting the claim, characteristic of science in its positivist and bureaucratic definition, to arbitrate in these struggles in the name of 'axiological neutrality'. The symbolic power of agents, understood as a power of making people see – *theorein* – and believe, of producing and imposing the legitimate or legal classification, depends, as the case of *rex* reminds us, on the position they occupy in the space (and in the classifications that are potentially inscribed in it). But to objectify objectification means, above all, objectifying the field of production of the objectified representations of the social world, and in particular of the legislative taxonomies, in short, the field of cultural or ideological production, a game in which the social scientist is himself involved, as are all those who debate the nature of social classes.

#### THE POLITICAL FIELD AND THE EFFECT OF HOMOLOGIES

We must examine this field of symbolic struggles, in which the professionals of representation – in every sense of the term – confront one another in their debate over another field of symbolic struggles, if we are to understand, without succumbing to the mythology of the 'awakening of consciousness', the shift from the

practical sense of the position occupied, *which is itself capable of being made explicit in different ways*, to properly political demonstrations. Those who occupy dominated positions in the social space are also situated in dominated positions in the field of symbolic production, and it is not clear whence they could obtain the instruments of symbolic production that are necessary in order for them to express their own point of view on the social space, were it not that the specific logic of the field of cultural production, and the specific interests that are generated within it, have the effect of inclining a fraction of the professionals engaged in this field to supply to the dominated, on the basis of a homology of position, the instruments that will enable them to break away from the representations generated in the immediate complicity of social structures and mental structures and which tend to ensure the continued reproduction of the distribution of symbolic capital. The phenomenon designated by the Marxist tradition as that of 'consciousness from outside', that is, the contribution made by certain intellectuals to the production and diffusion, especially among the dominated, of a vision of the social world that breaks with the dominant vision, cannot be understood sociologically without taking account of the homology between the dominated position of the producers of cultural goods within the field of power (or in the division of the labour of domination) and the position within the social space of the agents who are most completely dispossessed of the economic and cultural means of production: But the construction of the model of the social space which supports this analysis presupposes a definite break with the one-dimensional and one-directional representation of the social world underlying the dualist vision in which the universe of the oppositions constituting the social structure is reduced to the opposition between those who own the means of production and those who sell their labour-power.

The failings of the Marxist theory of class, above all its inability to explain the set of objectively observed differences, result from the fact that, by reducing the social world to the economic field alone, it is condemned to define social position with reference solely to the position within the relations of economic production. It thus ignores the positions occupied in the different fields and sub-fields, particularly in the relations of cultural production, as well as all those oppositions which structure the social field and which are not reducible to the opposition between the owners and non-owners of the means of economic production. Marxism imagines the social world as one-dimensional, as simply organized around the opposi-

tion between two blocs (one of the main questions thus becomes that of the *boundary* between these two blocs, with all the ensuing questions – which are endlessly debated – about the 'labour aristocracy', the 'embourgeoisement' of the working-class, etc.). In reality, the social space is a multi-dimensional space, an open set of relatively autonomous fields, fields which are more or less strongly and directly subordinate, in their functioning and their transformations, to the field of economic production. Within each of the sub-spaces, those who occupy dominant positions and those who occupy dominated positions are constantly involved in struggles of different kinds (without necessarily constituting themselves thereby as antagonistic groups).

But the most important fact, from the point of view of the problem of breaking out of the circle of symbolic reproduction, is that, on the basis of homologies between positions within different fields (and because, too, there is an invariant or even universal element in the relation between the dominant and the dominated), *alliances* can be set up which are more or less durable and which are always based on a more or less conscious misunderstanding. The homology of position between intellectuals and industrial workers – the former occupying within the field of power, that is, *vis-à-vis* the captains of industry and commerce, positions which are homologous to those occupied by industrial workers in the social space as a whole – is the source of an ambiguous alliance, in which cultural producers, the dominated among the dominant, supply to the dominated, by a sort of embezzlement of accumulated cultural capital, the means of constituting objectively their vision of the world and the representation of their interests in an explicit theory and in institutionalized instruments of representation – trade-union organizations, political parties, social technologies of mobilization and demonstration, etc.<sup>13</sup>

But one must be careful not to treat homology of position, a resemblance within difference, as an identity of condition (as happened, for instance, in the ideology of the 'three Ps', *patron, père, professeur* – 'boss', 'father', 'teacher' – developed by the ultra-left movement in France in the late 1960s). Doubtless, the same structure – understood as an invariant core of the forms of different distributions – recurs in different fields, and this explains why analogical thinking is so fertile in sociology. But the fact remains that the principle of differentiation is different each time, as are the stakes and the nature of the interest, and thus the *economy* of practices. It is after all important to establish a proper hierarchization of the principles of hierarchization, i.e. of the kinds of capital. Knowledge of the hierarchy of the principles of division enables

us to define the limits within which the subordinate principles operate, and thus to define the limits of those similarities linked to homology. The relations of the other fields to the field of economic production are both relations of structural homology and relations of causal dependence, the form of causal determinations being defined by structural relations and the force of domination being greater when the relations in which it is exercised are closer to the relations of economic production.

We would have to analyse the specific interests which representatives owe to their position in the political field and in the sub-field of the party or the trade union, and show all the 'theoretical' effects that they produce. Numerous academic studies of 'social classes' – I have in mind, for instance, the problem of the 'labour aristocracy' or of the 'managerial class' (*cadres*) – merely elaborate the practical questions which are forced on those who hold political power. Political leaders are continually faced with the (often contradictory) practical imperatives which arise from the logic of the struggle within the political field, such as the need to prove their representativeness or the need to mobilize the greatest possible number of votes while at the same time asserting the irreducibility of their project to those of other leaders. Thus they are condemned to raise the problem of the social world in the typically substantialist logic of the boundaries between groups and the size of the mobilizable group; and they can try to solve the problem which forces itself on every group anxious to know and demonstrate its own strength – and thus its existence – and let other people know it too, by resorting to elastic concepts such as 'working class', 'the people' or 'the workers'. Moreover, as a result of the specific interests associated with the position they occupy in the competition to impose their particular visions of the social world, theoreticians and professional spokespersons, in other words, all 'party officials', are inclined to produce differentiated and distinctive products which, because of the homology between the field of professionals and the field of consumers of opinion, are as it were automatically adjusted to suit the different forms of demand. Demand is defined, in this case more than ever, as a demand for difference, for opposition, which these professionals themselves help to produce by enabling it to find expression. It is the structure of the political field, that is, the objective relation to the occupants of other positions, and the relation to the competing stances they offer which, just as much as any direct relation to those they represent, determines the stances they take, i.e. the supply of political products. By virtue of the fact that the interests directly involved in the struggle

for the monopoly of the legitimate expression of the truth of the social world tend to be the specific equivalent of the interests of those who occupy homologous positions in the social field, political discourses are affected by a sort of structural duplicity: while they are in appearance directly aimed at the voters, they are in reality aimed at competitors within the field.

The political stances taken at any given moment (electoral results, for example) are thus the product of an encounter between a political supply of objectified political opinions (programmes, party platforms, declarations, etc.) linked to the entire previous history of the field of production, and a political demand, itself linked to the history of the relations between supply and demand. The correlation that can be observed at any given moment between stances on this or that political issue and positions in the social space can be understood completely only if one observes that the classifications which voters implement in order to make their choice (left/right, for instance) are the product of all previous struggles, and that the same is true of the classifications which the analyst implements in order to classify, not only opinions, but the agents who express them. The entire history of the social field is present, in each moment, both in a materialized form – in institutions such as the administrative organization of political parties or trade unions – and in an incorporated form – in the dispositions of agents who run these institutions or fight against them (with the effects of hysteresis linked to questions of loyalty). All forms of recognized collective identity – the 'working class' or the CGT trade union, 'independent craftsmen', 'managers', 'university graduates', etc. – are the product of a long and slow collective development. Without being completely artificial (if it were, the attempted establishment of these forms would not have succeeded); each of these representative bodies, which give existence to represented bodies endowed with a known and recognized social identity, exists through an entire set of institutions which are just so many historical inventions, a 'logo', *sigillum authenticum* as canon lawyers said, a seal or stamp, an office and a secretariat endowed with a monopoly over the corporate signature and the *plena potentia agendi et loquendi*, etc. As a product of the struggles which occurred within and outside the political field, especially concerning power over the state, this representation owes its specific characteristics to the particular history of a particular political field and state (which explains, *inter alia*, the differences between the representations of social divisions, and thus of groups represented, from one country to another). So as to avoid being misled by the

effects of the labour of *naturalization* which every group tends to produce in order to legitimize itself and fully justify its existence, one must thus in each case reconstruct the *historical labour* which has produced social divisions and the social vision of these divisions. Social position, adequately defined, is what gives the best prediction of practices and representations; but, to avoid conferring on what was once called one's *station*, that is, on social identity (these days more and more completely identified with one's professional identity) the place that 'being' had in ancient metaphysics, namely, the function of an essence from which would spring all aspects of historical existence – as is expressed by the formula *operatio sequitur esse* – it must be clearly remembered that this *status*, like the *habitus* generated within it, are products of history, subject to being transformed, with more or less difficulty, by history.

#### CLASS AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION

But in order to establish how it is that the power of constituting and instituting held by the authorized spokesperson – party or union boss, for instance – is itself constituted and instituted, it is not enough to explain the specific interests of the theorists or spokespersons and the structural affinities which link them to those whom they represent. One must also analyse the logic of the process of institution, ordinarily perceived and described as a process of delegation, in which the representative receives from the group the power of creating the group. If we transpose their analyses, we can here follow the historians of law (Kantorowicz, Post, etc.) when they describe the mystery of ministry – a play on words dear to canon lawyers, who link *mysterium* with *ministerium*. The mystery of the process of transubstantiation, whereby the spokesperson becomes the group he expresses, can only be explained by a historical analysis of the genesis and functioning of *representation*, through which the representative creates the group which creates him. The spokesperson endowed with full power to speak and act in the name of the group, and first and foremost to act on the group through the magic of the slogan, is the substitute of the group which exists only through this proxy; as the personification of a fictitious person, of a social fiction, he raises those whom he represents out of their existence as separate individuals, enabling them to act and speak through him as a single person. In return, he receives the right to take himself for the group, to speak and act as if he were the group incarnate in a

single person: '*Status est magistratus*', '*l'État, c'est moi*', 'the union thinks that . . .', etc.

The mystery of ministry is one of those cases of social magic in which a thing or a person becomes something other than what it/he is, a person (minister, bishop, delegate, member of parliament, general secretary, etc.) able to identify and be identified with a set of people (the People, the Workers) or with a social entity (the Nation, the State, the Church, the Party). The mystery of ministry is at its peak when the group can exist only by delegating power to a spokesperson who will bring it into existence by speaking for it, that is, on its behalf and in its place. The circle is then complete: the group is created by the person who speaks in its name, thus appearing as the source of the power that he exerts over those who are its real source. This circular relation is at the root of the charismatic illusion which means that, ultimately, the spokesperson may appear, to others as well as to himself, as *causa sui*. Political alienation results from the fact that isolated agents – and this is all the more true the more they are symbolically impoverished – cannot constitute themselves as a group, as a force capable of making itself heard in the political field, unless they dispossess themselves and hand over their power to a political apparatus: they must always risk political dispossession in order to escape from political dispossession. Fetishism, according to Marx, is what happens when 'the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own'; political fetishism lies precisely in the fact that the value of the hypostatized individual, that product of the human brain, appears as charisma, a mysterious objective property of the person, an elusive charm, an unnameable mystery. The minister – minister of religion or minister of state – is in a metonymic relation with the group; as part of the group, he functions as a sign replacing the group as a whole. It is the minister who, as an entirely real substitute for an entirely symbolic being, encourages one to make a 'category mistake', as Ryle would put it, rather similar to the one made by a child who, after having watched a procession of the soldiers composing the regiment, asks where the regiment is. By his mere visible existence, the minister constitutes the pure serial diversity of separate individuals into a moral person, transforms the *collectio personarum plurium* into a *corporatio*, a constituted body, and he may even, through mobilization and demonstration, make it appear as a social agent.

Politics is the site *par excellence* of symbolic effectiveness, an activity which works through signs capable of producing social

entities and, above all, groups. By virtue of the oldest of the metaphysical effects linked to the existence of a certain symbolism – that which enables one to consider as existing everything which can be *signified* (God or non-being) – political representation produces and reproduces, at every moment, a derivative form of the argument of the bald King of France so dear to logicians: any predicative statement with ‘the working class’ as its subject conceals an existential statement (*there is a working class*). More generally, all statements which have as their subject a collective – People, Class, University, School, State, etc. – presuppose that the question of the existence of this group has been solved and conceal that sort of ‘metaphysical fallacy’ which has been criticized in the ontological argument. The spokesperson is the person who, speaking about a group, speaking on behalf of a group, surreptitiously posits the existence of the group in question, institutes the group, through that magical operation which is inherent in any act of naming. That is why we must proceed to a critique of political reason – a reason which is inclined to commit abuses of language which are abuses of power – if we want to raise the question with which all sociology ought to begin, that of the existence and mode of existence of collectives.

A class exists in so far as – and only in so far as – representatives with the *plena potentia agendi* may be and feel authorized to speak in its *name* – in accordance with the equation, ‘the Party is the working class’, or ‘the working class is the Party’, an equation which reproduces that of canon lawyers, ‘the Church is the Pope (or the Bishops), the Pope (or the Bishops) is (or are) the Church’. In this way, a class can be given existence as a real force in the political field. The mode of existence of what is these days called, in a great number of societies (with variations, of course), the ‘working class’, is completely paradoxical: what we have is a sort of *existence in thought*, an existence in the minds of many of those who are designated by the different taxonomies as workers, but also in the minds of those who occupy the positions furthest removed from the workers in the social space. This almost universally recognized existence is itself based on the existence of a *working class in representation*, that is, on political and trade-union apparatuses and on party officials who have a vital interest in believing that this class exists and in spreading this belief among those who consider themselves part of it as well as those who are excluded from it; who are capable too of *giving voice* to the ‘working class’, and with a single voice to evoke it, as one evokes or summons up spirits, of

invoking it, as one invokes gods or patron saints; who are capable, indeed, of manifesting it symbolically through *demonstration*, a sort of theatrical deployment of the class-in-representation, with on the one side the body of party officials and the entire symbolic system that constitutes its existence – slogans, emblems, symbols – and on the other side the most convinced fraction of the believers who, by their presence, enable their representatives to give a representation of their representativeness. This working class as ‘will and representation’ (as Schopenhauer’s famous title puts it) has nothing in common with the class as action, a real and really mobilized group, imagined by the Marxist tradition; but it is no less real, with that magical reality which (with Durkheim and Mauss) defines institutions as social fictions. This is a true mystical body, created at the cost of an immense historical labour of theoretical and practical invention, starting with that of Marx himself, and endlessly recreated at the cost of innumerable and constantly renewed efforts and acts of commitment which are necessary in order to produce and reproduce belief and the institution designed to ensure the reproduction of belief. The ‘working class’ exists in and through the body of representatives who give it an audible voice and a visible presence, and in and through the belief in its existence which this body of plenipotentiaries succeeds in imposing, by its mere existence and its representations, on the basis of affinities which objectively unite the members of the same ‘class on paper’ as a probable group.<sup>14</sup> The historical success of Marxist theory, the first social theory to claim scientific status that has so completely realized its potential in the social world, thus contributes to ensuring that the theory of the social world which is the least capable of integrating the *theory effect* – that it, more than any other, has created – is doubtless, today, the most powerful obstacle to the progress of the adequate theory of the social world to which it has, in times gone by, more than any other contributed.

an 'existentialist' reading of *Being and Time*: the refutation of the interpretation of the concepts of *Being and Time* as a 'secular' version of religious concepts; the refutation of an 'anthropological' or 'moral' reading of the opposition between the authentic and the inauthentic (pp. 217–21); and the rather more laboured refutation of 'nationalism' in the analyses of the 'homeland' (*Heimat*), etc.

- 53 Heidegger, 'Letter on humanism'.  
 54 K. Axelos, *Arguments d'une recherche* (Paris: Minuit, 1939), pp. 93ff; see also K. Axelos, *Einführung in ein künftiges Denken über Marx und Heidegger* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1966).  
 55 What we see at work here – that is, in its practical truth – is the scheme of the 'ontological difference' between Being and beings: can it be a coincidence that it arises naturally when there is a need to emphasize distances and re-establish hierarchies, between philosophy and the social sciences in particular?  
 56 It is this blind understanding which is designated by the apparently contradictory declaration by Karl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (quoted by Habermas, 'Penser avec Heidegger contre Heidegger', p. 106): 'I began to read *Being and Time*, which had just been published, when I was still a student. Today I can state with a good conscience that at the time I understood nothing of it, strictly speaking. But I could not help feeling that it was there, and there alone, that thought could engage with the problems that I felt must lie behind modern theoretical physics, and today I would still grant it that.'  
 57 The same Sartre who would have smiled or been indignant at Heidegger's elitist professions of faith if they had come before him in the guise of what Simone de Beauvoir called 'right-wing thought' (forgetting, curiously, to include Heidegger), would not have been able to have the insight that he had into the expression which Heidegger's works gave to his own experience of the social world, expressed at length in the pages of *La Nausée*, if it had not appeared to him dressed in forms fitting the proprieties and conventions of the philosophical field.

### 7 On Symbolic Power

- 1 E. Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 16.
- 2 I have in mind the etymological sense of *kategorieren* as noted by Heidegger (i.e. 'to accuse publicly'); and also the terminology of kinship, which is a prime example of social categories (terms of address).
- 3 The neo-phenomenological tradition (Schütz, Peter Berger) and certain forms of ethnomethodology accept the same presuppositions merely by omitting the question of the social conditions of possibility of the *doxic experience* (Husserl) of the world (and in particular of the

social world), that is, of the experience of the social world as being self-evident ('taken for granted' in Schütz's words).

- 4 The ideological stances adopted by the dominant are strategies of reproduction which tend to reinforce both *within* and *outside* the class the belief in the legitimacy of the domination of that class.
- 5 The existence of a specialized field of production is the precondition for the appearance of a struggle between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, which share the common feature of being distinguished from *doxa*, that is, from what remains undiscussed.
- 6 It also means we avoid the ethnologism (visible in particular in the analysis of archaic thought) which consists in treating ideologies as myths, that is, as the undifferentiated products of a collective labour, and thus in ignoring all the features they owe to the characteristics of the field of production (e.g. in the Greek tradition, the esoteric re-interpretations of mythic traditions).
- 7 The symbols of power (e.g. clothes, sceptre) are merely *objectified* symbolic capital and their efficacy is subject to the same conditions.
- 8 The destruction of this power of symbolic imposition based on misrecognition depends on *becoming aware* of its arbitrary nature, i.e. the disclosure of the objective truth and the destruction of belief. Heterodox discourse – in so far as it destroys the spuriously clear and self-evident notions of orthodoxy, a fictitious restoration of the *doxa*, and neutralizes its power to immobilize – contains a symbolic power of mobilization and subversion, the power to actualize the potential power of the dominated classes.

### 8 Political Representation: Elements for a Theory of the Political Field

- 1 M. Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, vol. 2, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 1395ff., 1451ff.
- 2 Neo-Machiavellian theories take this division into account only to ascribe it to human nature. Thus Michels speaks of 'incurable incompetence' (R. Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, tr. E. and C. Paul (London: Jarrold and Sons, 1916), p. 421) or of 'the perennial incompetence of the masses' (p. 424) and describes the relation between professionals and non-professionals in the language of *need* (the masses' 'need for leadership' (p. 54), the masses' need for an object of veneration (p. 69), etc.), or in the language of *nature* ('The apathy of the masses and their need for guidance has as its counterpart in the leaders a natural greed for power. Thus the development of the democratic oligarchy is accelerated by the general characteristics of human nature' (p. 217)).

- 3 See, in particular, P. Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, tr. R. Nice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 397-465.
- 4 This implies that the division of political labour varies with the overall volume of economic and cultural capital accumulated in a given social formation (its 'level of development') and also with the more or less asymmetrical structure of the distribution of this capital, especially the cultural capital. In this way, the spread of access to secondary education was the source of a set of transformations of the relation between parties and their militants or electors.
- 5 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. N. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), para. 337, p. 108.
- 6 The relation between professionals and non-professionals takes very different forms for the dominant: since they are, most of the time, capable of producing their political acts and opinions themselves, it is never without a certain reticence and ambivalence that they resign themselves to delegation (imposed on them by the specific logic of legitimacy which, based as it is on misrecognition, condemns the temptation to celebrate one's own activities).
- 7 One can describe as a *party association* an organization whose almost exclusive object is to prepare for elections, and which derives from this permanent function a permanence which ordinary associations do not possess. Resembling an association by the limited and partial character of its objectives and of the commitment it requires and, thereby, by the thoroughly diversified social composition of its *clientele* (made up of electors and not of militants), it resembles a party by the permanence imposed on it by the recurrence of its specific function, namely, preparing for elections. (It is notable that the *ideal party* as described by Ostrogorski is precisely an association, in other words, a *temporary* organization, created *ad hoc* for the purposes of a given claim or a specific cause.)
- 8 A. Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings (1921-1926)*, tr. Q. Hoare (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1978), pp. 197, 12.
- 9 R. Luxemburg, *Masse et chefs* (Paris: Spartacus, 1972), p. 37; translated from the French.
- 10 A. Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings (1910-1920)*, tr. J. Andrews (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977), pp. 330-9.
- 11 In this way, for example, the elitist theory of opinion, which is implicit in the elaboration or analysis of opinion polls or in the ritual lamentations over the high level of abstentions, betrays itself, in all innocence, in inquiries into the *opinion-makers* which, drawing their inspiration from an emanationist philosophy of 'diffusion' as analogous to the streaming of liquid, aim to follow opinions back along the networks through which they circulate to the source from which they seemingly spring - in other words, to the 'elite' of 'opinion-makers', whom nobody ever thinks to ask for a reason for their opinions. (See for example C. Kadushin, 'Power, influence and social circles: a new

- methodology for studying opinion makers', *American Sociological Review*, 33 (1968), pp. 685-99.)
- 12 The fact remains that this evolution could be countered, to some degree, by the general rise in the level of education which, given the all-powerful importance of educational capital in the system of explanatory factors of variations in individuals' relation to politics, is probably of a kind to contradict this tendency and to reinforce, to different degrees depending on the apparatus involved, pressure from the base, which is less inclined to accept unconditional delegation.
- 13 The televised debate which brings together professionals chosen for their specific competence but also for their sense of political propriety and respectability, in the presence of a public reduced to the status of spectators, thus realizing class struggle in the form of a theatrical and ritualized confrontation between two champions, symbolizes perfectly the end of the process of autonomization of the political game properly speaking, one that is more than ever imprisoned in its techniques, its hierarchies and its internal rules.
- 14 On the logic of the struggle for the imposition of the principle of di-vision, see P. Bourdieu, 'Identity and representation', ch. 10 in this volume.
- 15 As proof of this, one need only cite the differences (which the necessities linked to the history and logic proper to each national political field bring out) between the different representations that the 'representative' organizations of social classes placed in equivalent positions, such as the working classes of different European countries, give of the interests of these classes. This is true despite all the efforts made to achieve a greater homogenization (such as the 'bolshevization' of the communist parties).
- 16 Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 2, p. 1447.
- 17 'Proletarian unity is blocked by opportunists of every hue, who defend the vested interests of cliques, material interests and especially interests derived from political power over the masses' (Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings (1910-1920)*, p. 178).
- 18 The paradigmatic form of this structural duplicity is probably represented by what the revolutionary tradition of the USSR calls 'the language of Aesop', that is, the secret, coded, indirect language to which revolutionaries resorted to evade the Tsarist censorship and which reappeared in the Bolshevik party, on the occasion of the conflict between the supporters of Stalin and those of Bukharin, that is, when it was a matter of preventing, by 'party patriotism', conflicts within the Politburo or the Central Committee from leaking out of the party to the outside world. This language conceals, behind its anodyne appearance, a hidden truth which 'any sufficiently cultivated militant' can decipher, and it can be read, depending on its addressees, in two different ways. See S. Cohen, *Nicolas Boukharine. La vie d'un bolchevik* (Paris: Maspero, 1979).
- 19 Hence the failure of all those who, like so many historians of Germany

- after Rosenberg, have attempted to define 'conservatism' absolutely, without seeing that its substantial content had to change continuously in order to conserve its relational value.
- 20 Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings (1921–1926)*, pp. 139–40.
- 21 Among the factors creating this effect of closure and the very special form of esotericism that it generates, one must include the frequently observed tendency among the party officials of political apparatuses to restrict their sphere of social interaction to other party officials.
- 22 Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings (1921–1926)*, p. 191 (my emphasis).
- 23 Failure to acknowledge what these concepts owe to history debar one from the one real possibility of freeing them from history. As tools of analysis but also of anathematization, instruments of knowledge but also instruments of power, all those concepts ending in '-ism' that the Marxological tradition eternalizes by treating them as pure conceptual constructions, free of any context and detached from any strategic function, are 'frequently linked to particular circumstances, tainted with premature generalizations, and marked by bitter polemics' and generated 'in divergence, in violent confrontations between the representatives of the various different currents' (G. Haupt, 'Les marxistes face à la question nationale: l'histoire du problème', in G. Haupt, M. Lowy and C. Weill, *Les marxistes et la question nationale, 1848–1914* (Paris: Maspero, 1974), p. 11).
- 24 It is well known that Bakunin, who imposed absolute submission to the leadership in the movements he constituted (for example the National Fraternity) and who was basically a supporter of the 'Blanquist' idea of 'active minorities', was led, in his polemic with Marx, to denounce authoritarianism and to exalt the spontaneity of the masses and the autonomy of the federations.
- 25 J. Maitron, *Le mouvement anarchiste en France* (Paris: Maspero, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 82–3.
- 26 The position (more or less central and dominant) in the party apparatus, and the cultural capital possessed, form the source of the different and even opposed visions of revolutionary action, the future of capitalism, relations between the party and the masses, etc., which confront each other within the workers' movement. It is, for instance, certain that economism and the propensity to accentuate the determinist, objective and scientific side of Marxism is more closely associated with 'scientists' and 'theoreticians' (for example, Tugan-Baranowski or the 'economists' in the social-democratic party) than with 'militants' or 'agitators', especially if their theory of economics is self-taught (that is doubtless one of the sources of the opposition between Marx and Bakunin). The opposition between centralism and spontaneism or, to put it another way, between authoritarian socialism and libertarian socialism, seems to vary in an altogether parallel way, the propensity to scientism and economism inclining people to entrust those who possess

- knowledge with the right to define, in an authoritative way, the line to be followed (the biography of Marx is traversed by these oppositions which, as he grows older, are decided in favour of the 'scientist').
- 27 Voting strategies also have to face the alternative between an adequate but powerless representation, on the one hand, and an imperfect but, by virtue of that very fact, powerful representation, on the other. In other words, the very logic which identifies isolation with powerlessness forces one to make *compromise choices* and confers a decisive advantage on stances already confirmed with regard to the original opinions.
- 28 It is no coincidence if opinion polls demonstrate the contradiction between two antagonistic principles of legitimacy, namely technocratic science and the democratic will, by alternating questions that appeal either to the judgement of an expert or to the wishes of the militant.
- 29 The violence of political polemics, and the constant recourse to ethical questioning, whose weapons are most frequently *ad hominem* arguments, can also be explained by the fact that mobilizing ideas owe part of their credit to the credit of the person who professes them. Furthermore, it is not merely a question of refuting them, by means of a purely logical and scientific argument, but of *discrediting* them by discrediting their author. By giving a free rein to ways of combating adversaries not only in their ideas but also in their person, the logic of the political field provides a highly favourable terrain for strategies of resentment: in this way, it offers to the first-comer a means of attaining, most often by a rudimentary form of the sociology of knowledge, theories or ideas which he would be incapable of submitting to scientific criticism.
- 30 E. Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society*, tr. E. Palmer (London: Faber, 1973), pp. 94–100.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 99.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- 33 The extreme caution which defines the accomplished politician, and which can be measured in particular by the high degree of euphemization of his discourse, can doubtless be explained by the extreme vulnerability of political capital, which means that the politician's trade is a high-risk profession, especially in periods of crisis when, as can be seen in the case of de Gaulle and Pétain, small differences in the dispositions and values involved may be the source of totally incompatible choices. (This is because the essence of extra-ordinary situations is to abolish the possibility of compromises, ambiguities, double-dealing, multiple memberships, etc., authorized by the ordinary recourse to multiple and partly integrated criteria of classification, by imposing a system of classification organized around a single criterion.)
- 34 One result of this is that the politician is a close associate of the journalist, who holds sway over the mass media and who thus has power over every kind of symbolic capital (the power of 'making or unmaking reputations' which Watergate showed in full measure).

Capable, at least in certain political situations, of controlling a politician's or movement's access to the status of a political force really counting for something, the journalist is, like the critic, bound to play the role of someone who points out the qualities of someone or something while being unable to do for himself what he does for others (and the attempts he may make to mobilize in favour of himself or his work the intellectual or political authorities which owe something to his action as a favourable judge are condemned in advance). Thus he is united to those he has helped to make (in proportion to his value as a favourable judge) by a relation of deep *ambivalence* which leads him to oscillate between admiring or servile submission and treacherous resentment, ready to speak his mind the minute the idol he has helped to produce commits some blunder.

- 35 Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society*, p. 324.
- 36 'Instead of leaders they have become bankers of men in a monopoly situation, and the least hint of competition makes them crazy with terror and despair' (Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings, 1922–1926*, pp. 17–18). 'In many respects a union leader represents a social type similar to the *banker*. An experienced banker, who has a good business head and is able to foresee with some accuracy the movement of stocks and bonds, wins credit for his institution and attracts depositors and investors. A trade-union leader who can foresee the possible outcome as conflicting social forces clash, attracts the masses into his organization and becomes a *banker of men*' (ibid., p. 77).
- 37 The opposition between the two kinds of political capital is the source of one of the fundamental differences between elected representatives in the Communist Party and those in the Socialist Party: 'Whereas the great majority of socialist mayors refer to the fact that they are well known public figures, whether this is due to family prestige, professional competence, or services rendered in the course of some activity or another, two thirds of the Communists consider themselves first and foremost as delegates of their party' (D. Lacorne, *Les notables rouges* (Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1980), p. 67).
- 38 The reader will no doubt think of the Gaullist adventure. But one could also find an equivalent in an altogether different region of the social and political space. Thus Denis Lacorne observes that elected representatives in the Communist Party who enjoy a personal notoriety almost always owe their status as 'local personalities' to some 'heroic act' performed during the Second World War (ibid., p. 69).
- 39 That being said, a political mission can be distinguished, even in this case, from a mere bureaucratic function by virtue of the fact that it always remains, as we have seen, a personal mission, which involves the whole person.
- 40 This is not the only feature which suggests that the workers' movement fulfils for the working class a function homologous to that which the

Church fulfils for peasants and for certain fractions of the petite bourgeoisie.

- 41 Here one can quote Michels: 'The most tenaciously conservative members of the organization are, in fact, those who are most definitely dependent on it' (Michels, *Political Parties*, p. 124). And further on: 'A party which has a well-filled treasury is in a position, not only to dispense with the material aid of its comparatively affluent members, and thus to prevent the acquirement by these of a preponderant influence in the party, but also to provide itself with a body of officials who are loyal and devoted because they are entirely dependent on the party for their means of subsistence' (ibid., p. 129). Or Gramsci: 'Today, the representatives of established interests – i.e. of the cooperatives, the employment agencies, the shared land-tenancies, the municipalities and the providential societies – although they are in a minority in the party, have the upper hand over the orators, the journalists, the teachers and the lawyers, who pursue unattainable and vacuous ideological projects' (Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings, 1921–1926*, p. 81).
- 42 Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 2, p. 1165.
- 43 These analyses also apply to the case of the Church: as the political capital of the Church is objectified in institutions and, as is the case in the recent period, in jobs controlled by the Church (in teaching, the press, youth movements, etc.), the Church's power tends to rest less and less on instilling doctrine and the 'cure of souls'; in this way, it can doubtless be better measured by the number of jobs and agents indirectly controlled by the Church than by the numbers of 'mass-goers' or 'Easter-worshippers'.
- 44 'The normal development of the trade union organization produced results that were the complete opposite of those that had been foreseen by trade unionism: the workers who had become trade union leaders completely lost their vocation as workers and their class spirit and acquired all the characteristics of the petty-bourgeois functionary, intellectually lazy, morally perverted or easy to pervert. The broader the trade union movement became, as it embraced great masses of people, the more officialdom took over' (A. Gramsci, *Ecrits politiques*, vol. III (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), pp. 206–7; translated from the French).
- 45 'Town halls represent the essential base of the Socialist Party's means, men and influence . . . So long as there are town halls, the party will last, will survive, whatever happens. It is easy to understand why the town halls are the socialists' mainstay. You might even say they are the only really serious thing. Ideology, declarations of principle, plans for action, programmes, debates, discussions, dialogues, all that is important, of course . . . But on the local level, the party is in power, or at least has the illusion that it is. That is why all the playing around has to stop when municipal elections come up. You have to face up to

- concrete problems. You defend your territory, without any theoretical prattling, strenuously, right up to the bitter end' (P. Guidoni, *Histoire du nouveau Parti socialiste* (Paris: Tema-Action, 1973), p. 120).
- 46 One can observe this in the apparently most unfavourable case, that of the Bolshevik Party: 'Behind the façade of declared political and organizational unity, known under the name of "democratic centralism", there was no such thing as a uniform Bolshevik political philosophy or ideology in 1917 or even several years later. On the contrary, the party included a remarkable variety of points of view: differences extended from semantic points to conflicts over the most basic options' (Cohen, *Nicolas Boukharine*, p. 19).
- 47 If one remembers the place that the working-class system of values grants to virtues such as integrity ('being wholehearted', 'being cut and dried', etc.), keeping your word, being loyal to your own people, being self-consistent ('that's just the way I am', 'I'm not going to have my mind changed for me', etc.), all of them dispositions which, in other universes, would appear as a form of rigidity or even stupidity, it becomes easy to understand how the effect of loyalty to one's original choices – a loyalty which tends to make membership of a political party an almost hereditary property, one which is capable of surviving changes in condition within or between generations – is particularly powerful in the case of the working classes and benefits especially the parties of the left.
- 48 Although it includes invariant characteristics, the opposition between the party officials and ordinary supporters (or, *a fortiori*, occasional voters) can be interpreted in very different ways depending on the parties. The key factor here is the distribution of capital and, above all perhaps, of *free time* among the classes. (It is, after all, well known that if direct democracy cannot resist economic and social differentiation, this is because, through the unequal distribution of free time which results from it, administrative responsibilities are concentrated in the hands of those who have at their disposal the time necessary to fulfil these functions for little or no remuneration.) This simple principle could also help to explain the differential participation of the different professions (or even of the different levels of status within a single profession) in political or trade-union life and, more generally, in all semi-political responsibilities. Thus Max Weber notes that directors of great institutes of medicine and the natural sciences are neither particularly inclined nor suitable to occupy the post of rector, and Robert Michels points out that scientists who have taken an active part in political life 'find that their scientific faculties undergo a slow but progressive atrophy' (Michels, *Political Parties*, p. 221). If one also notes that the social conditions which favour or authorize people's refusal to give their time to politics or administration also frequently encourage a certain aristocratic or prophetic disdain for the *temporal* profits that these activities might promise or procure, it becomes easy

- to understand some of the structural invariants of the relation between intellectuals in the different kinds of apparatus (political, administrative or other) and the 'free' intellectuals, between theologians and bishops, or between researchers and deans, rectors and scientific administrators, etc.
- 49 Lacorne, *Les notables rouges*, p. 114.
- 50 Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 2, p. 1149.
- 51 Robert Michels, who notes the close correspondence between the organization of the 'democratic party of combat' and military organization and the numerous respects (particularly in Engels and Bebel) in which socialist terminology is indebted to military jargon, observes that leaders, who, as he remarks, are closely attached to discipline and centralization (Michels, *Political Parties*, pp. 189, 208), never fail to appeal to the magic of common interest and to 'military-style arguments' every time their position is threatened: 'They maintain, for instance, that, if only for tactical reasons, and in order to maintain a necessary cohesion in the face of the enemy, the members of the party must never refuse to repose perfect confidence in the leaders they have freely chosen for themselves' (ibid., p. 237). But it is doubtless with Stalin that the strategy of *militarization* – which, as Stephen Cohen notes, is probably Stalin's sole original contribution to Bolshevik thought, and thus the principal characteristic of Stalinism – finds its fulfilment: sectors of intervention become 'fronts' (the grain front, the philosophy front, the literature front, etc.); objectives or problems are 'fortresses' that 'theoretical brigades' have to 'storm', etc. This 'military' thought is evidently Manichean, celebrating a group, a school of thought or a conception set up as an orthodoxy in order the better to destroy all the others (see Cohen, *Nicolas Boukharine*, pp. 367–8, 389).
- 52 Struggles within the communist party against the authoritarianism of the leaders, and against the priority they grant to the interests of the apparatus as opposed to the interests of those they represent, can clearly only reinforce the very tendencies they combat: the leaders need only mention, or even incite, political struggle, in particular against the most immediate competitors, in order to authorize an appeal to discipline – in other words, submission to the leaders – as is imposed in time of struggle. (In this sense, the denunciation of anti-communism is an absolute weapon in the hands of those who dominate the apparatus, since it disqualifies criticism, even objectification, and imposes unity in face of outside forces.)
- 53 See Cohen, *Nicolas Boukharine*, p. 185. An ethnographic study of practices of assembly would provide a thousand illustrations of these procedures of authoritarian imposition based on the practical impossibility of breaking, *without impropriety*, a unanimously cultivated unanimity (by abstaining in a show-of-hands vote, by crossing a name off a pre-established list, etc.).

## 9 Delegation and Political Fetishism

- 1 T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 227.
- 2 See L. Jaume, 'La Théorie de la "personne fictive" dans le Léviathan de Hobbes', *Revue française de science politique*, 33/6 (December 1983), pp. 1009–35.
- 3 See G. Post, *Studies in Medieval Thought, Public Law and the State, 1100–1322* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); also O. von Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* [1868] (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1954), especially vol. 3 (1881), para. 8, 'Die Korporationstheorie der Kanonisten', pp. 238–77 (I owe this reference to Johannes-Michael Scholz, whom I would like to thank); and P. Michaud-Quantin, *Universitas* (Paris: Vrin, 1970).
- 4 I. Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, 2nd edn, tr. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (La Salle, Ill.: 1960), p. 153.
- 5 F. W. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, tr. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 167.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 132.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 133.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 184.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 184–5.

## 10 Identity and Representation: Elements for a Critical Reflection on the Idea of Region

- 1 The difficulty of conceptualizing the economy of the symbolic in adequate terms can be seen for instance by the fact that, while managing, exceptionally, to avoid the culturalist idealism that is so much the rule in these matters, and devoting attention to the strategic manipulation of 'ethnic' characteristics, Patterson reduces the interest he sees as being at the source of these strategies to a strictly economic interest, thus neglecting everything which, in struggles over classification, obeys the tendency to maximize symbolic profit. (See O. Patterson, 'Context and choice in ethnic allegiance: a theoretical framework and Caribbean case study', in N. Glazer and D. P. Moynihan (eds), *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 305–49.)
- 2 E. Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society*, tr. E. Palmer (London: Faber, 1973), pp. 311–12 (and also, on *krainein*, as the power to predict, p. 332).
- 3 *Ibid.*, pp. 422–3.
- 4 Cultural difference is probably the product of a historical dialectic of cumulative differentiation. As Paul Bois has shown for peasants of the

- west of France whose political choices defied electoral geography, what makes the region is not space but time and history (P. Bois, *Paysans de l'Ouest. Des structures économiques et sociales aux options politiques depuis l'époque révolutionnaire* (Paris and the Hague: Mouton, 1960). The same thing could be shown with regard to Berber-speaking 'regions' which, at the end of a different historical evolution, were sufficiently 'different' from Arab-speaking 'regions' to give rise, on the part of the colonizer, to treatment that was very different (as in the case of education, for instance), and thus bound to reinforce the differences that had served them as a pretext and to produce new ones (those differences which are linked to emigration to France, for example), and so on. Even the 'landscapes' or 'native soil' so dear to geographers are in fact inheritances, in other words, historical products of social determinants. (See C. Reboul, 'Déterminants sociaux de la fertilité des sols', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 17–18 (November 1977), pp. 85–112. Following the same logic, and in opposition to the naïvely 'naturalist' usage of the notion of 'landscape', one would have to analyse the contribution of social factors to the processes by which a region is turned into a desert.)
- 5 The adjective 'Occitan' and, *a fortiori*, the noun 'Occitanie' are recent and scientific words (coined by Latinizing the *langue d'oc* into *lingua occitana*), designed to designate scientific realities which, for the time being at least, exist only on paper.
  - 6 In fact, this language is itself a social artefact, invented at the cost of a decisive indifference to differences, which reproduces on the level of the 'region' the arbitrary imposition of a unique norm against which regionalism rebels and which could become the real source of linguistic practices only at the price of a systematic inculcation similar to that which has imposed the generalized use of French or any other 'national' language.
  - 7 The founders of the Republican school system explicitly adopted the aim of inculcating, among other things, by the imposition of the 'national' language, the common system of categories of perception and evaluation capable of establishing a unified vision of the social world.
  - 8 The link, everywhere attested, between regionalist movements and feminist (and also ecological) movements stems from the fact that, being directed against forms of symbolic domination, they presuppose ethical dispositions and cultural competences (visible in the strategies employed) which tend to be encountered in the intelligentsia and in the new petite bourgeoisie (see P. Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, tr. R. Nice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 265–6, 357–63, 365–9).
  - 9 How else can one understand, other than as so many compulsive assertions of the claim to the magical *auctoritas* of the *ensor* as described by Dumézil, a claim which is part and parcel of the

sociologist's ambition: namely, the obligatory recitations of canonical texts on social classes (ritually contrasted with the statistical *census*) or, at a higher level of ambition and in a less classical style, the prophecies announcing 'new classes' and 'new struggles' (or the inevitable decline of 'old classes' and 'old' struggles), two genres which occupy a large place in so-called sociological production?

- 10 The reasons for the spontaneous repugnance felt by 'scientists' for 'subjective' criteria would deserve a long analysis: there is the naïve realism which leads one to ignore everything that cannot be pointed to or touched; there is the economism which leads to a failure to recognize any determinants of social action other than those that are visibly an integral part of the material conditions of existence; there are the interests attached to the appearances of 'axiological neutrality' which, in more than one case, constitute all the difference between the 'scientist' and the militant and which forbid questions and notions contrary to the proprieties from being introduced into 'scientific' discourse; there is, last and by no means least, the scientific *point of honour* which leads observers – and this is probably all the more the case the less sure they are of their science and their status – to multiply the signs of a *break* from the representations of common sense and which condemns them to a reductive *objectivism*, which is perfectly incapable of including the reality of common representations in the scientific representation of reality.
- 11 Marxist research into the national or regional question has been blocked, probably right from the start, by the combined effect of international utopianism (supported by a naïve evolutionism) and of economism, not to mention the effects of the strategic preoccupations of the moment which have often predetermined the verdicts of a 'science' oriented towards practice (and lacking both a true science of science and a science of the relations between practice and science). The effectiveness of these factors taken as a whole can be seen particularly clearly in the typically performative thesis of the primacy – which is so often contradicted by the facts – of class solidarities over 'ethnic' or national solidarities. But the inability to *historicize this problem* (which, to the same degree as the problem of the primacy of spatial relations or social and genealogical relations, is raised and answered in history) and the constantly asserted theoreticist pretention to designate 'viable nations' or to produce scientifically validated criteria of national identity (see G. Haupt. M. Lowy and C. Weill, *Les marxistes et la question nationale* (Paris: Maspero, 1974)), seem to depend directly on the degree to which the regal intention to rule and direct serves to orient the royal science of frontiers and limits: it is no coincidence that Stalin is the author of the most dogmatic and most *essentialist* 'definition' of the nation.

## 11 Social Space and the Genesis of 'Classes'

- 1 One can imagine that one has broken away from substantialism and introduced a relational mode of thought when one is in fact studying real interactions and exchanges. (In fact, practical solidarities, like practical rivalries, linked to direct contact and interaction – proximity – may be an *obstacle* to the construction of solidarities based on proximity in the theoretical space.)
- 2 Statistical investigation can grasp this relation of power only in the form of *properties*, sometimes legally guaranteed by *titles* of economic property, cultural property (educational qualifications) or social property (titles of nobility). This explains the link between empirical research into classes and theories of social structure as a system of *stratification* described in the language of distance from the instruments of appropriation ('distance from the focus of cultural values', in Halbwachs's terms), that Marx himself uses when he speaks of the 'mass deprived of property'.
- 3 In certain social universes, the principles of division which, like the volume and structure of capital, determine the structure of the social space, are reinforced by principles of division that are relatively independent of economic or cultural properties, such as ethnic or religious affiliation. The distribution of agents appears in this case as the product of the intersection of two spaces which are partly independent of each other, since an ethnic group situated in an inferior position in the space of ethnic groups can occupy positions in all the fields, even the highest, but with rates of representation that are inferior to those of an ethnic group situated in a superior position. Each ethnic group can thus be characterized by the social positions of its members, by the rate of dispersion of these positions and finally by its degree of social integration despite dispersion. (Ethnic solidarity may have the effect of ensuring a form of collective mobility.)
- 4 The same would be true for the relations between geographical space and social space. These two spaces never coincide completely; however, a number of the differences which are usually associated with the effect of geographical space, for example with the opposition between the centre and the periphery, are the effect of distance in social space, i.e. of the unequal distribution of the different kinds of capital in geographical space.
- 5 General Pershing's remark on landing in France in 1917 (tr.).
- 6 This *sense of realities* in no way implies a *class consciousness* in the social-psychological sense, which is the least unreal sense one may give to this word, i.e. an *explicit representation* of the position occupied in the social structure, and of the collective interests that are correlative with it; even less does it imply a *theory of social classes*, i.e., not only a system of classification based on explicit and logically coherent princi-

ples but also a rigorous knowledge of the mechanisms responsible for the distributions. In fact, to put an end to the metaphysics of the 'awakening of consciousness' and 'class consciousness', a sort of revolutionary *cogito* of the collective consciousness of a personified entity, we need only examine the social and economic conditions which make it possible for this form of distance from the present moment of practice to exist, a distance presupposed by the conception and formulation of a more or less elaborate representation of a collective future. (This is what I sketched out in my analysis of the relations between temporal consciousness, including the aptitude for rational economic calculation, and political consciousness among Algerian workers; see P. Bourdieu, *Algeria 1960*, tr. R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).)

- 7 In this case, the production of common sense consists, essentially, in the constant re-interpretation of the common stock of sacred discourses (proverbs, sayings, gnomic poems, etc.), in 'purifying the language of the tribe'. By appropriating the words in which everything recognized by a group is deposited, one gains a considerable advantage in struggles for power. This is clear in struggles for religious authority: the most precious word is the sacred word and, as Gershom Scholem observes, it is because mystical opposition to established religion has to re-appropriate established symbols in order to achieve recognition that it is 'recuperated' by the tradition. As stakes in different struggles, the words of the political lexicon carry a polemical charge in the form of the *polysemy* which is the trace of the antagonistic usages that different groups have made, or make, of these words. One of the most universal strategies resorted to by the professionals of symbolic power – poets in archaic societies, prophets, politicians – thus consists in putting *common sense* on your side by appropriating the words that are invested with value by the whole group because they are the repositories of its belief.
- 8 As Leo Spitzer has clearly shown with regard to *Don Quixote*, in which the same person is given several names, *polyonomasia* – the plurality of names, nicknames and sobriquets attributed to the same agent or the same institution – together with the polysemy of words or expressions designating the fundamental values of different groups, is the visible trace of struggles for the power to name, struggles which occur in all social universes (see L. Spitzer, 'Perspectivism in Don Quijote', in *Linguistics and Literary History* (New York: Russel and Russel, 1948)).
- 9 F. Kafka, *The Trial* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1953), p. 197.
- 10 The directory of trades and occupations is the realized form of that social neutralism which cancels out the differences constitutive of the social space by treating uniformly all positions as *professions*, at the cost of a constant shift from the definitional point of view (titles and qualifications, nature of the activity, etc.). When people in the Anglo-

Saxon world call doctors 'professionals', they are emphasizing the fact that these agents are defined by their profession, which is for them an *essential attribute*; on the other hand, someone who hitches carriages together is hardly defined at all by this attribute, which designates him only in so far as he performs a certain kind of work. As for the teacher who has passed the *agrégation* exam, he or she is qualified, like the hitcher of carriages, by a task, an activity, but also by a qualification and title, like the doctor.

- 11 Entering a profession with a title is increasingly dependent on the possession of an educational qualification, and there is a close relation between educational qualifications and professional remuneration. The situation is quite different in untitled occupations in which agents performing the same work may have very different educational qualifications.
- 12 Those who possess the same title tend to constitute themselves as a group and to provide themselves with permanent organizations (the association of doctors, associations of alumni, etc.) aimed at ensuring group cohesion (with periodical reunions, etc.) and at promoting the group's material and symbolic interests.
- 13 The most perfect illustration of this analysis can be found, thanks to the fine work done by Robert Darnton, in the history of that sort of cultural revolution that the dominated figures within the emergent intellectual field – people such as Brissot, Mercier, Desmoulins, Hébert, Marat, and so many others – carried out within the Revolutionary movement (destruction of the Academies, dispersion of the salons, suppression of pensions, abolition of privileges). This cultural revolution sprang from the status of 'cultural pariahs' and its first priority was to attack the symbolic foundations of power, contributing, by its 'politico-pornography' and its deliberately scatological lampoons, to the task of 'delegitimation' which is doubtless one of the fundamental dimensions of revolutionary radicalism. (See R. Darnton, 'The high Enlightenment and the low-life of literature in pre-revolutionary France', *Past and Present*, 51 (1971), pp. 81-115; on the exemplary case of Marat, who, as people often forget, was also – or initially – a bad physicist, see also C. C. Gillispie, *Science and Polity in France at the End of the Old Régime* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 290-330.)
- 14 For a similar analysis of the relation between the kinship group 'on paper' and the kinship group in practice as 'will and representation', see P. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, tr. R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) and *The Logic of Practice*, tr. R. Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).